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1 Introduction
Long before the global financial crisis, Rajan (2006) has predicted a perfect storm that will
hit the US and the rest of the world economies. He argued that a setting with low returns
followed by a period of high rates could lead to a sharp and messy realignment because of
managers’ search for yield as asset prices revalue.1 The realignment of financial markets that
followed the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008 proved him right.
Following the financial crisis in 2008, researchers begun to examine the link between
monetary policy and financial institutions’ appetite for risk.2 Based on the underpinnings
of the theoretical research on the risk-taking channel (e.g. see Borio and Zhu, 2012), several
researchers provided evidence that in an environment with low interest rates, banks exhibit
risk-taking behaviour. For example, Jime´nez et al. (2014), using a unique bank level dataset
for Spain, showed that bank loans to borrowers with bad credit history and higher probability
of default increase following a reduction in the overnight rates. Examining bank level data
from Bolivia, the US and the EU, similar observations were reported by Ioannidou et al.
(2015), Altunbas et al. (2014) and Angeloni et al., 2015. In contrast, De Graeve et al. (2008),
using a model that examines the interaction between bank-level distress and macroeconomic
risk, found that the probability of distress declines after a positive monetary policy shock.
Buch et al. (2014a) have provided strong evidence that the response of a forward-looking
bank risk to an expansionary monetary policy shock varies across different types of banks.
In particular, they found that small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk while
large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure and foreign owned banks take on
more risk.
In this context, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) argue that when banks are allowed to adjust their
capital structures, lower interest rates lead to greater leverage and higher risk. However, if
the capital structure is fixed, the impact of a reduction in interest rates on bank risk depends
on the degree of bank capitalization: well-capitalized banks increase risk, while highly levered
1In an earlier paper Borio and Lowe (2002) have shown that financial imbalances may develop in high
growth, low inflation, low interest rate economies which eventually require a monetary response to preserve
both financial and monetary stability.
2We do not suggest that monetary policy causes banks to adopt risk-taking behaviour. Monetary policy
authorities aim to keep the policy rate as close as possible to the equilibrium interest rate. If the equilibrium
rate happens to be low then the policy rate naturally should be low. To that end, the safe asset literature
provides a compelling explanation why US rates could have been low (see for instance, Negro et al., 2017 and
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).
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banks may decrease it, if loan demand is linear or concave. Also it is useful to recall the
financial accelerator model developed by Bernanke et al. (1996) which implies that lower
interest rates may have countervailing effects on bank risk. In particular, while low interest
rates would reduce bank risk by decreasing the interest burden of firms, it would also increase
the collateral value and borrowing capability of high-risk firms.3
In this study, we contribute to the empirical literature of risk-taking channel by im-
plementing a flexible econometric framework, which accounts both for the heterogeneity of
banks’ risk-taking behaviour in response to monetary policy shocks and for the transmission
of shocks across banks (spillover effects) with differing characteristics. We use the Global
Vector Autoregression (GVAR) methodology (see Pesaran et al., 2004) to estimate the po-
tential interactions among a large set of variables by decomposing the underlying large VARs
into smaller conditional models that are linked together through their cross-sectional aver-
ages while no restrictions are imposed on the dynamics of the individual sub-models.4 In
this setting, we can address issues that have not been examined earlier such as the spillover
effects or the heterogeneity of banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks.5
An additional contribution we make to this literature relates to the identification of
monetary policy shocks, as this problem constitutes a major challenge when examining the
linkages between the monetary transmission mechanism and the risk-taking channel. It is
well known that the use of a monetary shock which is not properly identified would yield
biased results in relation to its true causal effects on banks’ risk-taking behaviour. The main
difficulty in gauging the link between low interest rates and banks’ risk-taking behaviour is
to isolate changes in monetary policy from the impact of expected default. Although, one
can argue that monetary policy is exogenous to the future default rate, because financial
stability is not included directly in the bank’s loss function, the fact that defaults are related
to future economic conditions suggests for the presence of an indirect association between
3Furthermore, recent DSGE models have different implications about the role of monetary policy on bank
risk. Angeloni and Faia (2013) show that monetary expansion and a positive productivity shock increase
bank leverage and risk while Zhang (2009) argues that the reverse is true.
4A fundamental problem of global models is the curse of dimensionality, which arises when the number of
variables is large compared to the time dimension. Developing a global VAR approach, Pesaran et al. (2004)
were able to overcome this problem and analyze global interdependencies and the propagation of shocks across
countries.
5Alternatives to GVAR modeling approach are the factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) model or the panel
VAR (PVAR). Both FAVAR and PVAR can be viewed as data shrinkage processes. While in the former model
it is difficult to identify the unobserved factors, the latter approach in certain cases becomes operational by
imposing restrictions on the autoregressive coefficients.
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the current monetary policy and the expected default rates.6,7 Therefore, in investigating
the effects of monetary policy on banks’ risk-taking attitude, one should account for the
presence of endogeneity between the proxy for monetary policy and credit risk, as these
variables would respond simultaneously to expected macroeconomic conditions.8
To overcome the problem of endogeneity, we follow the Romer and Romer (2004) (here-
after RR) approach by regressing the intended fund rate changes on the contemporaneous
rate of unemployment and on the Fed’s internal forecast of inflation and of real economic
activity. In our investigation, we modify the RR approach such that the parameters of the
model are allowed to be time-variant with regime switching.9 We follow this route because
the RR approach imposes the restriction that the role of forward-looking variables in the
central bank’s reaction function remains constant across time. Our modification is consis-
tent with the findings of Barakchian and Crowe (2013) who argued that not only the Fed
has become more forward-looking after 1988 but also a monetary policy shock based on RR
approach was subject to structural breaks and time-variation.
We examine the presence of a risk-taking channel by scrutinizing the response of banks’
nonperforming loans to total loans ratio as monetary policy changes. We find that in the
short-run, banks’ nonperforming loans moderately decline in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock. However, in the medium-run, nonperforming loans tend to increase
for most of the banks in our sample, suggesting the prevalence of a risk-taking channel. Fur-
thermore, our investigation shows that although in the short-run the reaction of banks to
an expansionary policy shock is rather homogeneous, in the medium- and the long-run, the
magnitude and the duration of banks’ reactions vary. We provide evidence that banks’ het-
erogeneous risk-taking responses relate to their capital structure. Finally, when we examine
the impulse response functions, we provide evidence that bank size plays an important role
in the transmission of shocks (spillover effects): an adverse shock to the nonperforming loans
of a large bank would lead to an immediate and long lasting impact on the remaining banks
within the system, while no such effect is observed when the adverse shock emanates from
6Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that the central bank should react to asset prices only if the latter
undermines inflation stability.
7The minutes of the Federaral Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not discuss issues of financial stability
before the crisis of 2007. See for instance Bernanke (2008).
8For example, Ioannidou et al. (2015) argue that during periods of financial uncertainty central banks tend
to reduce the interest rate.
9Also see Caglayan et al. (2017) who followed a similar reasoning to examine the role of financial depth
on the asymmetric impact of monetary policy shocks on output growth.
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a smaller bank. We confirm our findings using banks’ Z-score as an alternative measure for
bank risk. We examine the presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy under nor-
mal economic conditions: the investigation uses quarterly data over the period from 1985Q1
to 2007Q4.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the
literature on the risk-taking channel. Section 3 explains our methodology. Section 4 provides
information on the data as well as the construction of the monetary policy shock and bank
risk measures. Section 5 presents our empirical observations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A brief literature review
Borio and Zhu (2012) suggest that there are at least three ways through which the risk-taking
channel may operate when interest rates are kept low or declining for a long period. First,
they argue that a reduction in the interest rate leads to an increase in collateral and asset
values of borrowers, which in turn influences banks’ risk perceptions or risk tolerance and
increase banks’ lending. In this context lending is driven by banks’ willingness to take on more
risk rather than improvements in debtors’ collateral and repayment capacity.10 The second
channel (referred to as ‘search for yield’ by Rajan, 2006) relates to the linkages between a
bank manager’s target return and the market rate of return. This channel operates through
financial institutions’ desire to engage in risky investment activities, as they are obliged
to reduce the gap between the yield on highly rated government bonds and the minimum
guaranteed rate of return linked to their liabilities.11 Thirdly, transparency may enhance
the perception that the central bank’s actions would cut off large downside risks encouraging
risk taking.
All three channels indicate that monetary policy easing will induce greater risk taking.
However, these channels will not operate in a similar way across different banks, different
banking systems and time. An analytical model provided by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) predicts
that the strength of the relationship between the policy rate and bank risk taking is a function
of bank’s capital structure, borrowers’ collateral and monitoring cost. In particular, they
show that the policy rate has a negative association with banks’ risk-taking behaviour which
relates to the capitalization of banks.
10This mechanism is similar but broader in spirit to the financial accelerator mechanism. See, for instance,
Bernanke et al. (1996), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Chen (2001).
11In some countries, such as Switzerland, a minimum rate of return is reinforced by regulation.
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Using bank level data, empirical researchers have examined the risk-taking channel by
scrutinizing whether banks extend loans to riskier borrowers during low interest rate periods.
To that end, Jime´nez et al. (2014), using loan-level data from the Spanish Credit Register,
have shown that lower overnight interest rates induces less capitalized banks to grant more
loans to ex-ante risky firms. They showed that these banks also commit to larger loan
volumes with fewer collateral requirements to firms which have a higher ex-post likelihood
of default. Ioannidou et al. (2015) have examined the impact of the federal funds rate on
the riskiness and pricing of new bank loans granted in Bolivia. They reported evidence that
initiating loans with a subprime credit rating or loans to riskier borrowers with current or past
non-performance become more likely when the federal funds rate is low.12 Maddaloni and
Peydro (2011), using data from the US and Europe, have shown that banks’ risk tolerance
increases when the short-term interest rate is low but not when the long-term interest rate
changes. Similar results are reported by Altunbas et al. (2014) and Angeloni et al. (2015)
who examined a sample of banks in Europe and the US.
Other researchers have shown that the impact of monetary expansion on bank risk might
be different across the banking system, time and banking groups. For instance, Buch et al.
(2014b), using a FAVAR model, which included both macro and bank level data from the
Call Reports, have shown that a backward-looking bank risk decline after a monetary policy
loosening, which is contradictory to the results found in the papers discussed above. Buch
et al. (2014a), using data from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending in the US, have
shown that there is no evidence of increased risk taking for the entire banking system after an
expansionary monetary policy shocks or an unexpected increase of housing prices. However,
they argued that there are important differences across banking groups. In particular, they
showed that bank risk increases for small domestic banks while it declines for foreign banks
and remains unchanged for large domestic banks. Furthermore, De Graeve et al. (2008) have
provided evidence of a decline in German banks’ probability of distress after a monetary
policy loosening.
We adopt an approach that differs from the literature by employing a GVAR model to
investigate banks’ risk-taking behaviour. We also discuss whether there is any type of sys-
tematic heterogeneity in the way banks react to exogenous shocks and examine the possibility
12Note that in both Jime´nez et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et al. (2015) monetary policy is exogenously given.
In the former case monetary policy is determined by the ECB while in the latter by the Fed.
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of spillover effects across banks. Finally, we confirm our findings using banks’ Z-score as an
alternative measure of risk. In what follows, we discuss our empirical methodology and our
findings.
3 Econometric methodology
An investigation regarding the impact of monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks on bank
risk while accounting for possible spillover and feedback effects requires a coherent global
model that includes a large set of variables from many institutions. There are a few method-
ologies that one may implement for such an investigation. A standard framework to examine
the transmission of shocks across banks and time is VAR models. However, unrestricted
VAR models cannot be estimated due to the large number of unknown parameters.
To get around the curse of dimensionality, researchers have proposed alternative ap-
proaches. For example, factor models can be interpreted as data shrinkage procedures,
which summarize the information of a large set of variables in few factors augmented by a
small set of observed variables (i.e. FAVAR models). Yet, the economic interpretation of
the extracted factors is a difficult task. Alternatively, panel VARs or large scale Bayesian
VARs solve the problem of dimensionality by shrinking the parameter space.13 In particu-
lar, Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) show that a panel VAR shrinks the parameter space by
assuming that the unknown parameters can be decomposed into components that are com-
mon across cross-sectional units and variables, common within cross-section units, a variable
specific component and lag specific component.
Unlike the panel VAR, the GVAR approach solves the dimensionality problem by breaking
down the underlying large VAR model into a small number of conditional models which are
linked together via their cross-sectional averages. That is, the GVAR methodology imposes
an intuitive restriction on cross-sectional linkages without imposing any restriction on the
dynamics of individual units, allowing the researcher to investigate the transmission of real
and financial shocks across countries, regions and financial intermediaries. In this context,
the GVAR approach lets us capture the risk of contagion within the financial system, which
has became more pronounced due to increasing financial integration and complex linkages
throughout the financial intermediaries.
13The difference between a Bayesian large scale VAR and a panel VAR is that the former treat all variables
symmetrically while the latter takes into account the structure of the variables (for details see Pesaran, 2015).
7
3.1 The GVAR model
We consider a world of N banks indexed by i=1, 2, ...N, and denote a ki × 1 vector of bank
specific variables, xit, and of bank specific foreign variables x
∗
it =Σ
N
j=1wijxjt where wij ≥ 0
is a sequence of bank specific weights with ΣNj=iwij = 1 and wii = 0. We construct the
associated weights based on banks’ bilateral interbank exposure, which we constructed using
banks’ aggregate interbank assets and liabilities. In doing so we assume that each bank
borrows and lends as widely as possible across all banks. This assumption implies that the
exposure of bank i to bank j is increasing both with the total interbank lending of bank i
and total interbank borrowing of bank j. In that sense, bank exposure reflects the relative
importance of an institution in the interbank market. In constructing the weights, we also
assume that the largest bank acts as a money center for the other banks in the system.14
The bank specific VARX ∗(pi, qi) can be written as:
15
Φi(L, pi)xit = ai0 + ai1t+Ψi(L, qi)dt +Λi(L, qi)x
∗
it + uit, (1)
where L is the lag operator, Φi(L, pi) = Iki −
pi∑
l=1
ΦlL
l, Λi(L, qi) =
qi∑
l=0
ΛlL
l and Ψi(L, qi) =
qi∑
l=0
ΨlL
l are matrix polynomials, dt is a g × 1 vector of observed common variables such as
regulatory and shifts dummies. The vector of bank-specific idiosyncratic shocks is denoted
by uit, where E(uitu
′
js) = Σij for t = s and E(uitu
′
js) = 0 for t 6= s. The dimensions
of aiη (η = 0, 1) are ki × 1 while the dimension of Φl,Λi, Ψi are ki × ki , ki × k
∗
i and
ki × g, respectively. Equation (1) indicates that spillover effects across banks can occur
through three distinct but interrelated channels: a) direct and lagged impact of x∗it on xit; b)
dependence of bank specific variables on common global exogenous variables (i.e. dt); and
c) non-zero contemporaneous dependence of shocks via cross-bank covariances Σij .
Reordering equation 1, we obtain:
Ai(L, pi, qi)zit = ai0 + ai1t+Ψi(L, qi)dt + uit, (2)
14Problems of this type can be solved by using a matrix-balancing algorithm known as RAS algorithm.
The approach discussed here has been used by Upper and Worms (2004) and Wells (2004). See Appendix A
for details.
15
VARX
∗(pi, qi) models with weakly exogenous non-stationary variables have been introduced by Harbo
et al. (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2000).
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where
zit = [xit,x
∗
it]
′
Ai(L, pi, qi) = [Φi(L, pi)−Λi(L, qi)].
Let p = max(pi, qi) and construct Ai(L, p) =
p∑
l=0
AilL
l then (2) can be written as
Ai0zit = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
Ailzit−l +
p∑
l=0
Ψildt−l + uit, (3)
where Ai0 = (Iki ,−Λi0), Ail = (Φil,Λil) for l = 1, 2, ...p, Φil = 0 for l > pi and Λil = 0 for
l > qi. Estimation of (3) is the first step of the GVAR approach. The second step consists
of stacking N bank specific models in one large global VAR. Letting xt = [x
′
1t,x
′
2t, ...x
′
Nt]
′
and using the (ki + k
∗
i ) × k link matrices Wi= [E
′
i, W˜i
′
], where E is a k × ki dimensional
selection matrix so that xit = E
′
i xt and W˜i is k × k
∗
i so that x
∗
it = W˜
′
ixt, we have
16:
zit =
xit
x∗it
 =Wixt. (4)
Substituting (4) into (3) yields
Ai0Wixt = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
AilWixt−l +
p∑
l=0
Ψildt−l + uit, (5)
and stacking these models for i = 1, 2, ...N, we obtain
G0xt = a0+a1t+
p∑
l=1
Glxt−l+
p∑
l=0
Ψldt−l + ut, (6)
16where x∗it = W˜
′
ixt = [wi1Ik1 wi2Ik2 · · ·wiNIkN ] [x1t x2t · · ·xNt]
′
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where ut = (u
′
1t,u
′
2t, ...,u
′
Nt)
′, and
a0 =

a10
a20
·
·
·
aN0

, a1 =

a11
a21
·
·
·
aN1

, Gl =

A1lW1
A2lW2
·
·
·
ANlWN

, Ψl =

Ψ1l
Ψ2l
·
·
·
ΨNl

for l = 1, 2, ...p. If the matrix G0 is invertible, then we can write (6) as:
xt =
p∑
l=0
Flxt−l+G
−1
0 ut, (7)
where Fl = G
−1
0 Gl. The GVAR model (7) can be solved recursively and used for the impulse
response function analysis.
4 Data
The analysis is carried out using both macroeconomic and bank level data on a quarterly basis
covering the period 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. We do not use the post 2007 data to avoid agency
problems between the borrowers and lenders, which are expected to be larger in crisis periods
in comparison to the normal times. Furthermore, as the framework of monetary policy has
changed substantially following the global financial crisis, it is preferable to examine the
presence of risk-taking channel of monetary policy in normal conditions to capture the true
relation.
Our GVAR framework utilizes bank level variables extracted from the Call Reports,
available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website.17 Using this dataset, we construct
bank’s total loans to total assets ratio, (tlit, rcfd1400/rcfd2170).
18 We use return on assets,
(qit, riad4340/rcfd2170), as a performance measure. The share of nonperforming loans to
total loans is our main proxy for bank risk (brit). Nonperforming loans are defined as assets
past due 90 days or more (rcfd1403), plus assets placed in nonaccrual status (rcfd1407).
17All insured banks in the US are required to submit income-statement and balance-sheet data to the
Federal Reserve each quarter, which is referred to as the Call Report.
18The numerator measures total loans and lease financing receivables net of unearned income. The denom-
inator is the bank’s total assets.
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We also used macroeconomic variables including the GDP (yt) and real house prices
(hprt ). Real house prices were measured as a ratio of the Freddie Mac Mortgage price to the
GDP deflator. Data on house prices were extracted from FreeLunch.com. Data on the GDP
deflator were obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
4.1 Constructing bank level data
To carry out the investigation, we extracted bank level data from the largest 100 banks in
the US given their 2007 total asset values. The analysis focused on those banks which fully
contribute to the dataset for the entire period under scrutiny. We screened banks from our
database if their loan to assets ratio was greater than one.19 Furthermore, we eliminated
those banks whose nonperforming loans to total loans ratio or return to asset ratio were in
the bottom or the top percentile at any point in time.20
Our final bank level sample is comprised of 30 banks which commanded 46% of the total
assets in the US banking system in 2007.21 Figure 1 shows the ranking of the banks in
the sample based on banks’ total assets, where the largest bank is Bank2 and the smallest
bank is Bank61. Table 1 provides some details on our bank level data. Figure 2 presents
the average total loans of these banks. Given the size of total loans depicted in this figure,
we deduce that some banks have a larger proportion of their assets in non-traditional bank
activities. As portrayed in Figure 3, which shows the composition of loan portfolio of all
banks, our sample is very heterogeneous. In fact, the theoretical literature on risk-taking
channel argues that individual bank characteristics plays a significant role on the response
of risk variables to monetary and other shocks.
4.2 Measuring bank risk
The risk-taking channel focuses on the incentives of banks to engage in ex-ante risky invest-
ments. Given the nature of our data, we can not distinguish new loans from outstanding
loans at the time of a monetary policy shock. Hence, similar to Buch et al. (2014b), we
use the share of nonperforming loans to total loans as our main proxy for bank’s risk (brit).
This proxy informs us about changes in the overall quality of the stock of credit and allows
us to scrutinize the relationship between monetary policy and the stability of the financial
19Twenty eight banks were not present over the entirety of our sample while three banks registered a loan
to asset ratio greater than one.
20Thirty nine banks failed to satisfy both criteria.
21Overall, these banks account for 60% of the assets of the top 100 banks in the US.
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intermediaries. Furthermore, this ratio is not significantly affected by the changes in the
accounting standards and it can be constructed over a long time period.
We use the Z-score, as an alternative proxy for bank risk.22 This measure can be inter-
preted as the distance (number of standard deviations) that a bank’s profit has to fall for
the bank to become insolvent. Hence, it is inversely related to the probability of insolvency:
the higher the Z-score is, the more stable the bank is. This widely used risk measure is
calculated as:
Z =
ROAit + CARit
Sd(ROAit)
where ROA is the return on assets (riad4340/rsfd2170), CAR is total equity over total assets
of bank i in year t (rcfd3210/rcfd2170) and Sd(ROA) is the standard deviation of return
on assets. Figures 4 and 5 show the ranking of banks in our sample according to their
nonperforming ratio and the Z-score, respectively. Even though the focus of each measure is
different, these figures show that both measures yield a very similar ranking of banks.
4.3 Measuring monetary policy shock
One of the challenges in examining the link between monetary policy shocks and banks’ risk-
taking behaviour is the identification of exogenous changes in monetary policy. The use of
poor proxies for monetary policy shocks would lead to biased results due to reverse causality
(that future risk may imply current monetary expansions) or omitted variables as such
variables, which are correlated with the stance of monetary policy, can influence risk-taking
activities of banks. Although expected defaults are not explicitly included in the reaction
function of central banks, they might be considered indirectly because expected economic
conditions would have a direct impact on future defaults. For example, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) argue that policy rates should not respond to changes in asset prices unless they signal
changes in expected inflation. Furthermore, Ioannidou et al. (2015) show that during periods
of financial uncertainty central banks tend to reduce interest rates. Therefore, one should
consider the endogeneity between monetary policy decision and financial uncertainty (during
which the number of expected defaults increase) in an empirical investigation.
A standard approach employed in the literature to identify a monetary policy shock has
been the VAR methodology. However, this methodology can be criticized in two aspects.
22See for example Laeven and Levine (2009), Foos et al. (2010) and Altunbas et al. (2011).
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First, because policy makers have become more forward looking over the years, identification
of monetary policy shocks using VAR models has become a more difficult task.23 Further-
more, the identification problem gets worse if there is evidence of non-fundamentalness.24
Second, Benati and Surico (2009) argue that there is a fundamental disconnect between what
is a structural shock within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and
what is identified as structural in the corresponding VAR representation implied by the same
DSGE model. In fact, recent research has shown that comparison of structural VAR (SVAR)
estimates with those from a DSGE model is not straightforward and that caution must be
exercised.25
The identification of monetary policy shocks becomes an even more complicated task once
we consider the view that central banks have to account for future defaults. To overcome this
hurdle, one can use the RR approach, which suggests regressing the intended policy rates
on the Fed’s forecast of inflation and real economic activity.26 However, the RR approach
assumes that the impact of forward looking variables on the central bank’s reaction function
remains constant across time. Yet, Barakchian and Crowe (2013), using estimates from a
five-year rolling window, have shown that the RMSE and R2 figures obtained from the
RR model vary significantly over the sample. Moreover, Barakchian and Crowe (2013) have
demonstrated that the forward-looking variables in the RR model becomes significant only
after 1988. These results suggest that a proxy which fails to capture time-variation and
structural breaks in the data generation process will lead to biased estimates. Hence, rather
than directly implementing the RR model, we extend it to account for time variation and
endogenous regime shifts by allowing the parameters of the conditional mean to be time-
varying while the variance of the error term to follow a Markov regime switching process.27
The resulting monetary policy series are plotted in Figure 6.
23Barakchian and Crowe (2013) demonstrated that the Fed became more forward looking after 1988. Also
see Orphanides (2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Leeper et al. (1996) on the forward looking behaviour
of the Fed.
24A model is subject to non-fundamentalness when structural shocks can not be recovered from the current
and past observations, see Hansen and Sargent (1991).
25For further discussion see Kilian (2013).
26Romer and Romer (2004) measured monetary policy shocks using a reaction function, in which the desired
federal funds target rate was the dependent variable and the right-hand side variables included the level of
the desired federal funds target prior to the FOMC meeting and the forecasts of 17 series (the current quarter
of unemployment, eight forecasts for the real GDP growth and the GDP deflator) taken from the Greenbook.
27To compute the Romer and Romer (2004) type shocks, we employed approximate Maximum likelihood
Estimator (MLE) as discussed in Kim (1994). For details concerning this algorithm see Kim and Nelson
(1999), section 5.5.
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Note that by allowing for parameters to be time-varying we account for the impact of
structural breaks driven by external uncertainty. In particular, by allowing for Markov
switching in the error term not only we account for the potential heteroscedasticty in the
errors but we also account for the unobserved forward looking elements represented by an
unobserved state variable. To that end, Jeanne and Masson (2000) argue that the unobserved
state of Markov switching model reflect market expectations. In the same spirit, Davig and
Leeper (2007) treat regime shifts as an ongoing process in the sense that if a regime has
changed, then a regime can change again. This is because, agents form expectations to
reflect the belief that a regime change is possible. Hence, expectations about regime changes
will affect the agents behaviour in the current regime.28 In our case, by allowing for time
variation and regime-shifts in the standard RR model, we implicitly account for alternative
sources of uncertainty that might affect the Fed’s reaction function.29
5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we present and discuss our empirical results.30 As a prerequisite, we start our
investigation by testing the order of integration of the endogenous and exogenous variables.
We then examine the endogeneity of bank specific foreign variables.31 Next, we discuss
impulse response functions of nonperforming loans to monetary policy shocks. Subsequently,
we examine the spillover effects that may emerge due to global shocks or due to shocks
emanating from large versus small banks. Lastly, we use banks’ Z-score as an alternative
measure of bank risk and confirm our findings.
Our GVAR model includes the following vectors of endogenous and star (exogenous)
variables:
xit= [brit, qit, tlit, yt, hp
r
t ],
x∗it= [br
∗
it, q
∗
it, tl
∗
it, rrt]
28Davig and Leeper (2007) argue that ongoing regime changes form expectations that can affect the response
of inflation and output to exogenous shocks. Extending the Taylor’s principle by allowing the parameters to
follow a Markov process, they show that a change from an active to a passive monetary policy can affect the
equilibrium under the former regime in two important ways. First, if the passive regime is sufficiently passive
or persistent, then multiple equilibrium can arise. Second, even in a determinate equilibrium the possibility
of switching to a dovish regime can raise aggregate volatility.
29Appendix B presents our extension to the RR approach.
30Empirical results are obtained using the GVAR toolbox provided by Smith and Galesi (2014).
31Results for the unit root, endogeneity test and other statistics concerning the relationship between do-
mestic and foreign variables (i.e. elasticities and pairwise correlation) are provided in Appendix C.
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where, brit, qit, tlit, yt, hp
r
t denote bank risk, return on assets, total loans to assets, output
growth and real house prices, respectively. The corresponding exogenous foreign specific
variables and the monetary policy shock are given by br∗it, q
∗
it, tl
∗
it and rrt, respectively. Note
that by construction, monetary policy shocks (rrt) are assumed to be exogenous. Further-
more, based on the estimation of VARX ∗(pi, qi), the null hypothesis of exogeneity for all
variables in x∗it are confirmed.
6 Impulse response function analysis
In what follows, we simulate the following innovations: 1) the impact of an expansionary
monetary policy shock on banks’ nonperforming loans and return on assets; 2) the impact
of a negative global shock on banks’ nonperforming loans; 3) the impact of a negative shock
that emanates from a large and a small bank on the rest of the banks’ in the system. Results
from banks’ Z-score, as an alternative proxy for risk-taking behaviour, confirm our findings.
6.1 Impulse response to an expansionary monetary policy shock and bank
heterogeneity
Here, we focus on the effect of a negative interest rate shock (expansionary monetary policy)
to scrutinize banks’ risk-taking behaviour. In doing so we examine the effect of a downward
movement in policy rate rather than an upward movement, because bank risk is more sen-
sitive to expansionary monetary policy shocks (see Lopez et al., 2011). In what follows, we
investigate the behavior of banks’ nonperforming loans and confirm our observations by ex-
amining movements in banks’ Z-score in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
Response of nonperforming loans
Figure 7 shows that, in the short-run, nonperforming loans of all banks generally decline
in response to a downward one standard deviation shock to monetary policy. However, this
initial response reverses in the medium-run as nonperforming loans begin to increase for most
banks. In particular, banks’ nonperforming loans, i.e. bank risk, increase after the fourth
quarter following the expansionary monetary policy shock. This reversal is considered as
evidence in favour of the risk-taking channel (see, for example, Altunbas et al., 2011).
The dynamics of nonperforming loans can be explained as follows. Following an ex-
pansionary monetary policy shock, banks extend credit to credit worthy as well as risky
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borrowers, as the collateral and asset values of potential borrowers increase. In the short-
run, all new borrowers are expected to pay the interest charge on the loans given the low
rates. As a result, a drop in nonperforming loans is expected when the interest rate declines
due to the reduction of the interest burden on existing borrowers. However, in the long-run,
as interest rates increase, coupled with the competitive nature of the business environment,
a fair number of riskier borrowers could fail to comply with their commitments and render
an increase in nonperforming loans. In fact this is what we observe in Figure 7.
The reaction of nonperforming loans to the monetary policy shock varies across banks.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) argue that in the medium- to long-run, the response of bank risk to a
monetary policy shock is driven by two countervailing forces, which are related to the bank’s
capital structure. In particular, due to limited liability there is the risk-shifting effect, which
increases the probability of monitoring after a decrease of the policy rate. Alternatively,
there is the pass-through effect, which decreases the incentive to monitor due to declining
profits following a decrease in the lending rate. The relative strength of these two forces
depend on the extent of bank capitalization. For low level of capitalisation the former will
dominate the latter effect and lead to a lower level of nonperforming loans. This is because
low policy rates will increase the intermediation margin. Thus, banks with high levels of
leverage have an incentive to increase monitoring to realize expected returns from higher
margin. However, for banks with high levels of capital, the pass-through effect will dominate
leading to an increase of nonperforming loans. In the light of this discussion, banks with
higher deposits in their capital structure are expected to yield low risk (for instance Bank2,
Bank13, Bank26, Bank33 and Bank61), whereas, banks with high equity to capital ratio (for
instance Bank5 and Bank7) would exhibit stronger movements in their nonperforming loans.
Figure 8 plots banks’ average equity capital ratios.
Response of return on assets
A related problem is the evolution of return on assets as monetary policy changes. Figure 9
depicts the response of banks’ return on assets to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
We find that banks’ return on assets would increase in the short-run but fall in the medium
horizon. This is consistent with the results observed in Figure 7 where nonperforming loans
decrease in the short-run but increase in the medium-run. As a consequence, return on
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assets increases initially, as nonperforming loans decline. However, in the medium-run, as
nonperforming loans increase, return on assets declines.
Recall that, through a negative change of the policy rate, the policymakers’ aim is to
achieve higher economic growth and lower unemployment by inducing businesses to increase
their fixed investment expenditures. However, our examination show that expansionary
monetary policy shocks can introduce a certain fragility into the financial system evidenced
by declining return on assets and increasing nonperforming loans in the medium- to the
long-run. This observation is in contrast with the initial objectives of the policy makers and
suggestive for the prevalence of the risk-taking channel.
6.2 Spillover effects: Global versus bank specific shocks
An important question is whether there is evidence of spillover effects of credit risk within
the banking system. To examine the spillover effects we took two routes. Initially, following
Dees et al. (2007), we generated a global bank risk shock, which is defined as the weighted
average of specific shocks across all banks and examined its impact on nonperforming loans
of individual banks. Results, which are available upon request, do not provide clear evidence
of spillover effects due to global shocks. For some banks there is evidence that the risk is
increasing but for some others we find no such effects.
In contrast, when we investigate the impact of an adverse shock emanating from an
individual bank to the rest of the system, we find evidence that risk could spillover through
the financial system. To that end, we provide details for the case of a shock that emanated
from a large bank, Bank3, and that from a small bank, Bank61. It should be noted that
in terms of assets, Bank3 is on average ten times larger than Bank61. Furthermore, based
on the Z-score and nonperforming loans, it turns out that Bank3 is one of the riskiest bank
whereas Bank61 can be considered as one of the least risky bank in our sample.
Figures 10 and 11 portray the response of banks to a positive shock to the nonperforming
loans of Bank3 and Bank61 (i.e. large and small banks), respectively.32 Figure 10 shows that
the nonperforming loans of banks increase significantly when an adverse shock emanates
from Bank3.33 In contrast, Figure 11 provides evidence that the remaining banks in the
32We identify shocks using the orthogonalization scheme suggested by Dees et al. (2007). In particular, a
recursive identification scheme is adopted based on bank size where small banks are preceded by large banks.
33The magnitude of the response is not homogeneous across all banks, some banks show a strong and
significant response while others show a mild but long lasting response. In some cases nonperforming loans
decrease after about a year.
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system are not affected significantly when a similar type of shock emanates from Bank61.
The presence of spillover effects from a large and risky bank to the rest of the banks should
be of concern to the policy makers. Given our findings, there is a firm basis for regulators
and policy makers to closely monitor large banks, as managers’ of larger banks may have
the tendency to approve loans to riskier borrowers. Were the interest rates to increase
unexpectedly, these banks can easily end up with substantial amounts of nonperforming
loans, affecting the whole banking sector. Furthermore, if these banks are considered to be
too big to fail, their managers would not refrain from lending to riskier borrowers in search for
higher yield when they believe that the bank would be rescued by the Fed. As a consequence,
risk-taking behaviour of large risky banks could ultimately yield a financial system which is
open to systemic failures.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis
To check the robustness of our findings, we repeated the analysis using banks’ Z-score as an
alternative measure of risk and obtained similar results. In particular, Figure 12 plots the
response of the Z-score to an expansionary monetary policy shock. The figure depicts an
immediate and significant decline of the Z-score (including banks Bank2, Bank7, Bank19,
Bank53 among others) following the monetary policy shock, and provide support in favor
of the risk-taking channel. Interestingly, the Z-score also increases for four of the banks in
the sample (i.e., Bank13, Bank25, Bank30 and Bank58), suggesting that bank risk for these
institutions declines when the monetary policy is relaxed. Among these four banks, only
Bank13 is relatively large.
When we use banks’ Z-score to examine the spillover effects, our results remain similar
to our earlier findings. Figure 13 plots the impulse responses of banks’ Z-score to a shock
emanating from Bank3 (large bank). Here, we observe that bank risk increases for a large
fraction of banks (the Z-score declines). Figure 14 displays the results of the same experiment
for the smallest bank (Bank61) as the source of the shock. In this case, we do not observe
a significant response from any bank. We would like to note that we also investigated the
impact of an adverse shock to Bank13’s Z-score and found that it did not have any impact
on the rest of the banks in our system. This is in line with our prior expectations. Although
relatively large, Bank13 has a low risk structure. Results for this experiment are available
upon request.
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7 Conclusion
In this study, we use the GVAR framework to investigate three interrelated questions con-
cerning the risk-taking channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. We examine the
impact of a downward exogenous change of policy rate on banks’ risk-taking activities. We
scrutinize whether banks’ risk taking behaviour is homogeneous. Lastly, we examine whether
there are spillover effects due to global and bank specific shocks.
Our investigation, based on a panel of large US banks, provides evidence of an active risk-
taking channel in the US. In particular, we show that banks’ risk-taking behaviour is more
pronounced for large, well capitalized banks; an observation consistent with Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2017) who discuss the role of capital structure in relation to banks’ risk-taking behaviour.
Lastly, we provide evidence that shocks originating from larger and riskier banks have lasting
effects on the whole system, while shocks from smaller and less risky banks do not. Our
investigation also yields that global shocks do not lead to spillover effects in our system. The
results are robust to the use of banks’ nonperforming loans and Z-score as alternative risk
measures.
Our findings are relevant and important to both monetary policy authorities and aca-
demic circles. Given that standard monetary policy rules ultimately affect the financial
markets through several drivers such as credit, liquidity and risk taking, we argue that pol-
icy makers should not ignore but monitor the stability of the financial intermediaries. In
fact, as the debate goes on, many countries which were effected by the global financial crisis
have already begun to implement macroprudential policies to prevent the build up of finan-
cial imbalances and to ensure that the financial system is resilient to shocks. More research
along these lines is needed.
References
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., and Marques-Ibanez, D. (2014). Does Monetary Policy Affect
Bank Risk? International Journal of Central Banking, 10(1):95–136.
Altunbas, Y., Marque´s-Iba´n˜ez, D., and Manganelli, S. (2011). Bank Risk During the Finan-
cial Crisis: Do Business Models Matter? Working Paper Series 1394, European Central
Bank.
Angeloni, I. and Faia, E. (2013). Capital Regulation and Monetary Policy with Fragile
Banks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(3):311–324.
19
Angeloni, I., Faia, E., and Lo Duca, M. (2015). Monetary Policy and Risk Taking. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 52(C):285–307.
Barakchian, S. M. and Crowe, C. (2013). Monetary Policy Matters: Evidence from New
Shocks Data. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(8):950–966.
Benati, L. and Surico, P. (2009). VAR Analysis and the Great Moderation. The American
Economic Review, 99(4):1636–1652.
Bernanke, Ben S, B., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S. (1996). The Financial Accelerator and
the Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(1):1–15.
Bernanke, B. S. (2008). Reducing Systemic Risk: A Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 22, 2008.
Speech 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Bernanke, B. S. and Gertler, M. (1995). Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of
Monetary Policy Transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4):27–48.
Bernanke, B. S. and Gertler, M. (1999). Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility. Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 84(Q IV):17–51.
Boivin, J. and Giannoni, M. P. (2006). Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective? The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(3):445–462.
Borio, C. and Zhu, H. (2012). Capital Regulation, Risk-taking and Monetary Policy: A
Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism? Journal of Financial Stability, 8(4):236–
251.
Borio, C. E. and Lowe, P. W. (2002). Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability:
Exploring the Nexus. BIS Working Papers 114, Bank for International Settlements.
Buch, C. M., Eickmeier, S., and Prieto, E. (2014a). In Search for Yield? Survey-Based
Evidence on Bank Risk Taking. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 43(C):12–
30.
Buch, C. M., Eickmeier, S., and Prieto, E. (2014b). Macroeconomic Factors and Microlevel
Bank Behavior. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(4):715–751.
Caglayan, M., Kocaaslan, O. K., and Mouratidis, K. (2017). The Role of Financial Depth on
the Asymmetric Impact of Monetary Policy. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
79(6):1195–1218.
Canova, F. and Ciccarelli, M. (2013). Panel Vector Autoregressive Models: A Survey. In
Fomby, T. B., Kilian, L., and Murphy, A., editors, VAR Models in Macroeconomics - New
Developments and Applications: Essays in Honor of Christopher A. Sims, Advances in
Econometrics, pages 205–246. Emerald.
Censor, Y. and Zenios, S. A. (1997). Parallel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, and Appli-
cations. Oxford University Press.
Chen, N.-K. (2001). Bank Net Worth, Asset Prices and Economic Activity. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 48(2):415–436.
Davig, T. and Leeper, E. M. (2007). Generalizing the Taylor Principle. American Economic
Review, 97(3):607–635.
20
De Graeve, F., Kick, T., and Koetter, M. (2008). Monetary Policy and Financial (In)stability:
An Integrated Micro-Macro Approach. Journal of Financial Stability, 4(3):205–231.
Dees, S., Mauro, F. d., Pesaran, M. H., and Smith, L. V. (2007). Exploring the International
Linkages of the Euro Area: A Global VAR Analysis. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
22(1):1–38.
Dell’Ariccia, G., Laeven, L., and Suarez, G. A. (2017). Bank Leverage and Monetary Pol-
icy’s Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from The United States. The Journal of Finance,
72(2):613–654.
Elliot, G., Rothenberg, T. J., and Stock, J. H. (1996). Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive
Unit Root. Econometrica, 64(4):813–836.
Fang, S.-C., Rajasekera, J. R., and Tsao, H.-S. J. (2012). Entropy Optimization and Math-
ematical Programming, volume 8. Springer Science & Business Media.
Foos, D., Norden, L., and Weber, M. (2010). Loan Growth and Riskiness of Banks. Journal
of Banking & Finance, 34(12):2929–2940.
Hansen, L. and Sargent, T. (1991). Two Difficulties in Interpreting Vector Autoregressions.
In Hansen, L. and Sargent, T., editors, Rational Expectations Econometrics. Westview
Press.
Harbo, I., Johansen, S., Nielsen, B., and Rahbek, A. (1998). Asymptotic Inference on Coin-
tegrating Rank in Partial Systems. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 16(4):388–
399.
Ioannidou, V., Ongena, S., and Peydro´, J.-L. (2015). Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and
Pricing: Evidence From a Quasi-Natural Experiment. Review of Finance, 19(1):95–144.
Jeanne, O. and Masson, P. (2000). Currency Crises, Sunspots and Markov-Switching
Regimes. Journal of International Economics, 50(2):327–350.
Jime´nez, G., Ongena, S., Peydro´, J. L., and Saurina, J. (2014). Hazardous Times for Mone-
tary Policy: What Do Twenty Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Mone-
tary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking? Econometrica, 82(2):463–505.
Kilian, L. (2013). Structural Vector Autoregressions. In Handbook of Research Methods
and Applications in Empirical Macroeconomics, chapter 22, pages 515–554. Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Kim, C.-J. (1994). Dynamic Linear Models with Markov-Switching. Journal of Econometrics,
60(1-2):1–22.
Kim, C.-J. and Nelson, C. R. (1999). State-Space Models with Regime Switching. Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
Kim, C.-J. and Nelson, C. R. (2001). A Bayesian Approach to Testing for Markov-Switching
in Univariate and Dynamic Factor Models. International Economic Review, 42(4):989–
1013.
Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2012). The Aggregate Demand for Treasury
Debt. Journal of Political Economy, 120(2):233–267.
21
Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2009). Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking. Journal
of Financial Economics, 93(2):259–275.
Leeper, E. M., Sims, C. A., Zha, T., Hall, R. E., and Bernanke, B. S. (1996). What Does
Monetary Policy Do? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996(2):1–78.
Leybourne, S., Kim, T.-H., and Newbold, P. (2005). Examination of Some More Powerful
Modifications of the Dickey–Fuller Test. Journal of Time Series Analysis, 26(3):355–369.
Lopez, M., Tenjo, F., and Zarate, H. (2011). The Risk-Taking Channel and Monetary
Transmission Mechanism in Colombia. Ensayos sobre Pol´ıtica Econo´mica, 29(SPE64):212–
234.
Maddaloni, A. and Peydro, J.-L. (2011). Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision, and
Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro-area and the U.S. Lending Standards. Review
of Financial Studies, 24(6):2121–2165.
Negro, M. D., Giannone, D., Giannoni, M. P., and Tambalotti, A. (2017). Safety, Liquidity,
and the Natural Rate of Interest. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 48(1):235–316.
Orphanides, A. (2003). Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the Taylor Rule. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 50(5):983–1022.
Pantula, S. G., Gonzalez-Farias, G., and Fuller, W. A. (1994). A Comparison of Unit-Root
Test Criteria. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 12(4):449–459.
Park, H. J. and Fuller, W. A. (1995). Alternative Estimators and Unit Root Tests for the
Autoregressive Process. Journal of Time Series Analysis, 16(4):415–429.
Pesaran, M. H. (2004). General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels.
IZA Discussion Paper 1240, IZA.
Pesaran, M. H. (2015). Time Series and Panel Data Econometrics. Oxford University Press.
Pesaran, M. H., Schuermann, T., and Weiner, S. M. (2004). Modeling Regional Interdepen-
dencies Using a Global Error-Correcting Macroeconometric Model. Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics, 22(2):129–162.
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., and Smith, R. J. (2000). Structural Analysis of Vector Error
Correction Models with Exogenous I(1) Variables. Journal of Econometrics, 97(2):293–
343.
Rajan, R. G. (2006). Has Finance Made the World Riskier? European Financial Manage-
ment, 12(4):499–533.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2004). A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: Derivation
and Implications. American Economic Review, 94(4):1055–1084.
Sgherri, S. and Galesi, A. (2009). Regional Financial Spillovers Across Europe; A Global
VAR Analysis. IMF Working Papers 09/23, International Monetary Fund.
Smith, L. and Galesi, A. (2014). GVAR Toolbox 2.0.
Upper, C. and Worms, A. (2004). Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German Interbank
Market: Is There a Danger of Contagion? European Economic Review, 48(4):827–849.
22
Wells, S. (2004). Financial Interlinkages in the United Kingdom’s Interbank Market and the
Risk of Contagion. Working paper Series 230, Bank of England.
Zhang, L. (2009). Bank Capital Regulation, the Lending Channel and Business Cycles.
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 33/2009, Deutsche Bundesbank.
23
8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary information
Name of the Bank Bank’s Rank Consolidated Domestic Domestic Foreign
ID Assets Assets(%) Branches Foreign
JPMORGAN CHASE BK NA 852218 2 1,179,390 652,824(55) 2852 46
CITIBANK NA 476810 3 1,019,497 537,86(53) 1005 375
WACHOVIA BK NA 484422 4 518,123 487,894(94) 3159 11
WELLS FARGO BK NA 451965 5 398,671 398,546(100) 4052 2
U S BK NA 504713 6 217,802 216,581(99) 2822 1
SUNTRUST BK 675332 7 182,628 182,628(100) 1942 0
NATIONAL CITY BK 259518 11 134,345 133,894(100) 1468 2
STATE STREET B & TC 35301 13 96,296 82,651(86) 2 10
PNC BK NA 817824 15 90,142 88,357(98) 953 0
KEYBANK NA 280110 16 88,081 85,863(97) 1158 1
BANK OF NY 541101 17 85,952 52,731(61) 8 9
CITIBANK SD NA 486752 19 79,761 79,761(100) 0 0
COMERICA BK 60143 21 58,543 57,252(98) 382 1
FIFTH THIRD BK 723112 25 52,672 52,672(100) 415 1
NORTHERN TC 210434 26 52,313 33,358(64) 17 3
FIFTH THIRD BK 913940 29 48,441 48,441(100) 718 0
M & I MARSHALL 983448 30 48,017 48,017(100) 309 0
COMMERCE BK NA 363415 33 41,170 41,170(100) 343 0
FIRST HORIZON NAT CORP 485559 36 37,608 37,608(100) 222 0
HUNTINGTON NB 12311 38 34,914 34,914(100) 491 0
COMPASS BK 697633 39 34,181 34,181(100) 444 0
MELLON BK NA 934329 42 26,226 22,713(87) 26 1
ASSOCIATED BK NA 917742 46 20,532 20,532(100) 351 0
ZIONS FIRST NB 276579 51 14,849 14,848(100) 169 0
CITY NB 63069 53 14,665 14,665(100) 72 0
BANK OF OK NA 339858 54 14,366 13,766(96) 79 0
COMMERCE BK NA 601050 56 13,891 13,891(100) 169 0
FIRST-CITIZENS B & TC 491224 58 13,327 13,327(100) 334 0
FROST NB/CULLEN 682563 59 13,307 13,307(100) 123 0
VALLEY NB/VALLEY NBC 229801 61 12,364 12,364(100) 161 0
Notes: The table shows information about the 30 banks used in this paper as of 2007. The ranking is
based on total assets. Assets are in thousands of U.S.$. Data are from The Federal Reserve System, see
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/.
Figure 1: Banks’ Ranking According to Assets Size
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Notes: The figure shows ranking of the 30 banks used in the analysis with respect to banks’ 2007
asset size. The figure is constructed using “rcfd2170” call report item.
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Figure 2: Banks’ Average Total Loans
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Notes: The figure shows the average total loans of the 30 banks over the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4.
The figure is constructed using “rcfd1400” call report item.
Figure 3: Banks’ Total Loan Composition
0
20
40
60
80
100
Lo
an
 Po
rtfo
lio 
Co
mp
os
itio
n
Ban
k2
Ban
k3
Ban
k4
Ban
k5
Ban
k6
Ban
k7
Ban
k11
Ban
k13
Ban
k15
Ban
k16
Ban
k17
Ban
k19
Ban
k21
Ban
k25
Ban
k26
Ban
k29
Ban
k30
Ban
k33
Ban
k36
Ban
k38
Ban
k39
Ban
k42
Ban
k46
Ban
k51
Ban
k53
Ban
k54
Ban
k56
Ban
k58
Ban
k59
Ban
k61
Real Estate Commercial Individuals
Notes: The figure shows the composition of the loan portfolios of the 30 banks used in the paper. The
figure represents the average of each component over the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The figure
is constructed using: “rcfd1975” to capture loans to individuals, “rcfd1600” to capture commercial and
industrial loans and “rcfd1410” to capture loans secured by real estate.
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Figure 4: Banks’ Average Nonperforming Loans Ratio
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Notes: The figure shows the ranking of the average nonperforming loans ratio of the 30 banks used in the
paper over the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The figure is constructed using: “rcfd1400” to capture
total loans and “rcfd1407+rcfd1403” to capture total nonperforming loans.
Figure 5: Banks’ Average Z-score
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Notes: The figure shows the average Z-score of the 30 banks used in the paper over the sample period,
1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The figure is constructed using: “riad4340” to capture net income, “rsfd2170” to
capture total assets and “rcfd3210” to capture total equity capital.
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shock Measure
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Notes: The figure plots the Romer and Romer (2004) based monetary policy measure accounting for
time variation and endogenous regime shifts by allowing the parameters of the conditional mean to be
time-varying while the variance of the error term to follow a Markov regime switching process. The sample
period is, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4.
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Figure 7: Response of Nonperforming Loans To a Negative Shock in Interest Rate
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Figure 8: Average Equity to Capital Ratio
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Notes: The figure shows the average equity to capital ratio of the 30 banks used in the paper over the
sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The figure is constructed using: “rcfd1400” to capture total loans and
“rcfd1407+rcfd1403” to capture total nonperforming loans.
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Figure 9: Response of Return on Assets To a Negative Shock in Interest Rate
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Figure 10: Response of Nonperforming Loans To a Negative Shock in Bank3 nonperforming Loans
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Figure 11: Response of Nonperforming Loans To a Negative Shock in Bank61 nonperforming Loans
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Figure 12: Response of Banks’ Z-score To a Negative Shock in Interest Rate
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Figure 13: Response of Banks’ Z-score To a Negative Shock in Bank3 Z-score
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Figure 14: Response of Banks’ Z-score To a Negative Shock in Bank61 Z-score
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9 Appendices
Appendix A: Estimating Bilateral Exposure with Incomplete Information
For a system of N banks we are aiming to estimate a matrix of the form:1
X=

x1,1 · · · x1,j · · · x1,N
·
xi,1 · · · xi,j · · · xi,N
·
xN,1 · · · xN,j · · · xN,N

a1
·
ai
·
aN
l1 · · · lj · · · lN
where xij denotes outstanding loans made by bank i to bank j, ai =
∑
j
xi,j and lj =
∑
i
xi,j
are respectively, bank i’s interbank total assets and liabilities.2 In general, since one can
only observe each bank’s total interbank debt (lj) and credits (ai) further restrictions are
required in order to identify bilateral bank exposure (xij). In the absence of any further
information, a sensible approach suggested by the literature is to assume that banks maximise
the uncertainty of their interbank activity. This implies that the amount lend by bank i
to bank j, is increasing in both bank i’s share of total lending and of bank j’s share of
total borrowing. Normalizing
N∑
i=1
ai =
N∑
j=1
lj = 1, the individual exposure will be given by
xij = ailj . In this specification, exposures reflect the relative importance of each institution
in the interbank market.
Note, the above problem doesn’t account for the restriction that a bank can not be
exposed to itself. However, it is straightforward to impose the restriction that the diagonal
elements ofX are equal to zero. Given an initial estimate ofX0, one can solve a minimisation
problem to find a matrix X as close as possible to X0 subject to row and column adding up
restrictions (i.e. ai =
∑
j
xi,j and j =
∑
i
xi,j).
3 A suitable distance measure for this type
of problem is the cross-entropy between two matrices (see Fang et al., 2012). Following this
approach the appropriate interbank structure is given by the solution to:
min
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
xij ln
(
xij
x0ij
)
1
X contains N2 while the a and l provides 2N pieces of information. Therefore, identification of X will
require N(N − 2) restrictions on X.
2Note that ai is computed by summing across row i while summing down across column j gives lj .
3The elements of X0 are given by
x
0
ij =
{
0 if i = j
ailj , otherwise
}
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subject to
N∑
i=1
xij = lj
xij ≥ 0
Note also that xij = 0 if, and only if x
0
ij = 0, and ln(0/0) = 0. This sort of problem is solved
numerically by using RAS algorithm.4
Appendix B: Romer and Romer (2004) Approach
Romer and Romer (2004) estimate the following model to derive a proxy for monetary policy
shocks:
∆ffm=α+ βffbm +Σ
2
i=−1γi∆ymi +Σ
2
i=−1λi(∆ymi −∆ym−1,i) (1)
+Σ2i=−1ϕiπmi +Σ
2
i=−1θi(πmi − πm−1,i) + ρum0 + εm
where ∆ffm is the change in the desired funds rate around the FOMC meeting at date m.
The level of the desired fund rate before any change related to meeting is denoted by ffbm.
The forecast of inflation, real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are depicted as π,
∆y and u. The subscript i refers to the forecast horizon: −1 is the previous quarter, 0 is
the current quarter, 1 is the next quarter and 2 is two quarters ahead. We extent the RR
approach by allowing the estimated parameters in (1) to be time-varying.5 In particular, we
write (1) in a state-space form as follows:
yt = X
′
tξt + et, et ∼ N(0, σ
2
e) (2)
ξt = Fξt−1 + vt, vt ∼ N(0, Qt) (3)
where yt = ∆ffm, X
′
t = [ffbm,∆ymi, (∆ymi −∆ym−1,i), πmi, (πmi − πm−1,i), um0],
and ξ = [α, β, γi, λi, ϕi, θi, ρ] for i = −1, 0, 1, 2. Equations (2) and (3) are the measurement
and transition equation of (1). The Kalman filter is then applied to make inferences on
the changing regression coefficients ξt. The Kalman filter gives insights into how a rational
agent updated his estimates of the coefficients in a Bayesian context with the arrival of new
information in a world of uncertainty, especially under changing policy.
Note that the conditional variance of (2) consists of filter uncertainty and uncertainty
concerning the future shocks:
ft|t−1 = XtPt|t−1X
′
t + σ
2
e (4)
where Pt|t−1 represents filter uncertainty conditional on information up to time t − 1 and
σ2e represents uncertainty concerning the future exogenous shocks. To account for potential
heteroscedasticity of the exogenous uncertainty we estimate a model where et follows a
4For further details see Censor and Zenios (1997).
5Kim and Nelson (2001), based on stability test results on the regression coefficients, consider a time-
varying parameter model for the U.S. monetary growth function.
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Markov process. Therefore, the version of model (2) and (3) with switching effects takes the
following form:
et ∼ N(0, σ
2
e,St
) (5)
σ2e,St = σ
2
0 + (σ
2
1 − σ
2
0)St, σ
2
1 > σ
2
0 (6)
To estimate the model given by equations 2-6, we employ Kim (1994) algorithm.
Appendix C: Preliminary Analysis of GVAR model
C1: Unit root test
The estimation of each conditional VARX model is based on the assumption that the vari-
ables included in these models are integrated of order one. We test all variables included in
the GVAR model for unit root using the weighted-Symmetric Augmented Dickey-fuller (WS
ADF) test introduced by Park and Fuller (1995).6 The unit-root test results suggest that
we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root for most of the variables.7 We also find that
the global variables and output are both integrated of order one.8
C2: Exogeneity test
A vital assumption in the estimation of individual bank VARX ∗(pi, qi) model is the weak
exogeneity of bank specific foreign variables (x∗it). The weak exogeneity assumption in the
context of a cointegrating model implies that there is no long-run feedback from bank-
specific domestic variables (xit) to the bank-specific foreign variables (x
∗
it), without ruling
out any lagged short-run feedback between the two sets of variables. If the weak exogeneity
assumption is not rejected then x∗it is said to be a “long-run forcing” for xit, which implies
that the disequilibrium errors do not have any information about the marginal distribution of
x∗it. A formal test for the weak exogeneity of bank-specific foreign variables is implemented by
testing the joint significance of the estimated error correction terms in the marginal models
of the foreign variables. In particular, for each variable ℓ of x∗it the following regression is
carried out:
∆x∗it,ℓ= ci0,ℓ +
ri∑
j=1
δij,ℓECM
j
i,t−1 +
p∗i∑
s=1
φis,ℓ∆xit−s + (7)
q∗i∑
s=1
θis,ℓ∆x
∗
it−s +
j=1∑
j=0
ψij,ℓ∆dt−j + uit,ℓ,
where ECMij,t−1, j = 1, 2, ...ri, are the estimated error correction terms associated with ri
cointegrating vectors found for bank i. In equation (7) p∗i and q
∗
i are the orders of lagged
6Note that Leybourne et al. (2005) and Pantula et al. (1994) show that the WS ADF test outperforms
both the traditional ADF and the GLS-ADF test proposed by Elliot et al. (1996).
7We also carried out the Augmented Dickey-fuller (ADF) test. Results from these tests are similar and
are available upon request.
8Test results are available from the authors upon request.
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changes of domestic and foreign variables; (xit) and (x
∗
it), respectively.
9 The test for weak
exogeneity is an F -test of the joint hypothesis that δij,ℓ = 0, for j = 1, 2, ..., ri in (7). The
F -test results, which we summarize in Table D1, Appendix D, show that the weak exogeneity
assumption is not rejected for most of the foreign and global variables at the 5% significant
level.
C3: Impact elasticity of foreign variables on domestic variables
Table D2 provides the contemporaneous effect of the foreign (starred) variables on their
domestic (bank level) counterparts, which can be interpreted as the impact elasticity of
the starred variables on the domestic variables. The information presented in this table is
particularly informative in describing the linkages across the banks under scrutiny. Most of
these elasticities are significant and high in magnitude. In particular, we observe that the
elasticity of bank risk captured through nonperforming loans (brit and br
∗
it) is found to be
significant in more than 60% of the sample, mainly for larger banks in the sample. This
suggests the presence of relatively strong co-movements across banks’ nonperforming loans.
Using Bank2 as an example, we see that a 1% increase in nonperforming loans of foreign
banks, (br∗2t), will lead to a 2.7% increase in nonperforming loans of Bank2 (br2t). This
finding, can be considered as prima facie evidence of spillover effects across banks in our
sample. Table D2 also shows that for a considerable fraction of banks there is high elasticity
of bank return on assets (qit and q
∗
it) implying strong co-movements between bank specific
and foreign return on assets. Separately, when we examine total loan to assets ratio, we
observe a mild and negative elasticity (tlit and tl
∗
it), which are significant only for a few
banks.
C4: Average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations
One of the key assumptions of GVAR modeling is that idiosyncratic shocks of conditional
VARX ∗ models are cross-sectionally weakly correlated such as Cov(uit,ℓ,x
∗
it)→ 0, with N →
∞, which ensures that foreign bank variables are weakly exogenous. To see whether foreign
variables are effective in reducing the cross-sectional correlation of idiosyncratic shocks across
all variables in the GVAR, we have computed the average pairwise cross-sectional correlation
for the level and the first differences of the endogenous variables in the model and the
associated residuals.10 This approach relates to the cross-sectional dependence test proposed
in Pesaran (2004). In particular, conditioning the bank specific models on foreign variables,
the remaining correlation across banks is expected to be small.
Table D3 presents the average pair-wise cross sectional correlations for the level and the
9Note the specification of marginal model in (7) is independent of the conditional VARX ∗ model in (1).
Therefore, the lagged orders p∗i and q
∗
i are not necessarily the same as the pi and qi of bank specific VARX
∗(
pi, qi).
10In particular, we compute, both in levels and in first differences, the average pair-wise correlation of
bank-specific variables. For example, the average pair-wise correlation of the bank risk of bank i is given by:
bri =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ρij(br) where ρij(br) is the correlation of the bank risk of bank i with the bank risk of bank j, N
is the number of banks included in our sample. The residuals are obtained after estimating all bank-specific
VARX
∗(pi, qi) models.
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first difference of the endogenous variables in the model, as well as the associated model’s
residuals. Results show that the average cross sectional correlation is generally high for
the level of endogenous variables and declines for the first difference and the estimated
VARX ∗ residuals. In particular, the highest cross-sectional correlation is observed for the
level of nonperforming loan of large banks. This observation is consistent with the view
that nonperforming loans reflect changes in the underlying macroeconomic environment.
Whereas the return on assets and loans to assets ratios show a lower correlation.11 This
finding suggests that changes in return on assets and loan to assets ratio reflect changes in
bank behaviour concerning managerial and policy preferences.
When the first difference of the variables are considered, the correlations fall for all
variables and banks. The cross-sectional correlation for the residuals for all VARX ∗ models
is very small, indicating that the model is successful in capturing the common effects among
the variables. Moreover, these results show the importance and usefulness of modeling the
bank specific foreign variables, as confirmed by the size of the bank residual correlations.
Appendix D: Tables
Table D1: Test for Weak Exogeneity at the 5% Significance Level
Bank’s F test Critical Nonperf. return on Loan to GDP Interest hpi
name value 5% loans assets assets rate
Bank2 F(2,76) 3.1170 3.4775 2.7901 1.1392 5.7994 0.0127 0.7164
Bank3 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0009 5.1588 0.1122 2.1454 0.4877 1.7710
Bank4 F(1,77) 3.9651 1.5094 1.9309 0.8267 0.8158 0.0072 0.3070
Bank5 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.9018 0.1347 0.3269 1.5914 2.0194 0.3593
Bank6 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0412 0.0553 1.4257 0.0643 0.0640 3.9422
Bank7 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.5578 2.9591 1.4253 1.2630 7.2486 0.4582
Bank11 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.8892 2.1146 2.4606 0.9227 0.3254 0.9293
Bank13 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.4823 4.2033 2.4025 1.6600 3.8017 1.7200
Bank15 F(2,76) 3.1170 2.3757 1.0253 1.5619 2.6316 0.4066 1.5268
Bank16 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.3926 0.7289 0.1981 0.1039 0.8308 0.2694
Bank17 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.1077 1.5679 1.4994 0.6576 0.4908 1.0246
Bank19 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.7606 2.1864 1.0255 0.5495 0.9425 1.2365
Bank21 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.0665 4.6269 2.9454 1.9350 2.4128 1.7943
Bank25 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.4716 0.3736 5.8730 0.4513 0.1984 3.8645
Bank26 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.4335 2.3407 0.9013 0.3357 4.3716 0.2398
Bank29 F(1,77) 3.9651 1.2707 0.2132 1.1634 1.2994 0.4682 0.2249
Bank30 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.1343 0.8612 2.9386 0.3735 3.3881 0.7690
Bank33 F(3,75) 2.7266 1.1061 4.5798 0.4717 1.5142 0.5416 0.2772
Bank36 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.4226 2.0718 0.8569 4.7184 0.9441 1.3861
Bank38 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.7324 0.3926 2.4811 0.9101 7.2336 1.2041
Bank39 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.9952 0.0377 1.6445 0.2445 0.3726 0.0984
Bank42 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.8712 0.1628 1.9042 1.6287 1.2571 0.0213
Bank46 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0097 1.4337 0.1994 8.5880 0.0048 1.6164
Bank51 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.6700 3.8676 0.6857 0.1578 1.3134 0.1268
Bank53 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.9231 0.2885 0.1015 1.0184 1.9646 0.0007
Bank54 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.1378 4.4748 0.9187 1.4493 1.2937 0.5683
Bank56 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.1013 2.4943 0.4794 0.9546 3.0382 1.0555
Bank58 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.7165 3.5846 0.8237 0.1425 2.1528 1.3477
Bank59 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.3865 0.3588 0.0683 0.0968 4.7613 0.0283
Bank61 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.4397 4.3236 1.7975 2.0857 5.0037 0.1572
Notes: The number which follows the word “Bank” refers to the ranking of the bank among the top 100
banks according to assets values at the end of 2007. This means that Bank2 is the second largest bank in
the US in 2007.
11Similar results are found by Sgherri and Galesi (2009) who analysed credit growth using data from several
countries.
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Table D2: Contemporaneous Effect of Foreign Variables on Domestic Variables
Nonperforming Return on Loan to Nonperforming Return on Loan to
loans assets assets loans assets assets
Bank2 2.716*** 0.886** 0.448 Bank29 0.109* 0.001 0.463**
(11.087) (3.223) (1.154) (1.652) (0.003) (3.062)
Bank3 1.374*** 0.809*** 0.181 Bank30 0.03 0.109* 0.068
(10.035) (4.535) (1.268) (0.485) (1.569) (0.452)
Bank4 0.152** 0.227* 0.058 Bank33 0.157* 0.011 0.114
(2.6) (1.907) (0.278) (1.994) (0.186) (1.114)
Bank5 0.353*** 0.244* 0.145 Bank36 0.052 0.064 -0.128
(4.574) (1.522) (1.139) (0.807) (0.563) (-1.031)
Bank6 0.194*** 0.064 -0.017 Bank38 0.006 0.276** -0.267**
(3.832) (0.714) (-0.084) (0.106) (2.047) (-2.221)
Bank7 0.056 0.02 0.362** Bank39 0.07* 0.037 -0.236*
(1.324) (0.434) (2.197) (1.589) (0.753) (-1.486)
Bank11 0.178** 0.286** -0.361 Bank42 0.513** -0.075 0.262
(2.832) (2.133) (-2.06) (3.195) (-0.305) (1.278)
Bank13 0.034 -0.144** 0.236** Bank46 0.005 0.047 -0.053
(0.782) (-2.096) (2.14) (0.086) (1.134) (-0.254)
Bank15 0.605*** 0.19** 0.172 Bank51 0.02 0.147 0.139
(9.366) (1.199) (0.722) (0.175) (1.049) (0.762)
Bank16 0.129* 0.167* 0.388** Bank53 0.358* 0.171 -0.152
(1.812) (1.565) (2.695) (1.75) (1.345) (-0.838)
Bank17 0.145 0.33** -0.087 Bank54 -0.02 0.34 0.362**
(1.245) (2.252) (-0.401) (-0.088) (1.242) (2.367)
Bank19 0.336** 0.86* -0.038 Bank56 -0.072 0.073 -0.045
(2.157) (1.791) (-0.144) (-1.395) (1.279) (-0.202)
Bank21 0.037 0.509** 0.463*** Bank58 0.021 0.055 0.096
(0.508) (3.17) (4.184) (0.74) (1.238) (0.92)
Bank25 0.123** 0.203** 0.701** Bank59 -0.087 0.018 -0.082
(2.435) (2.161) (3.006) (-0.527) (0.195) (-0.577)
Bank26 0.276** 0.263** 0.103 Bank61 0.075* 0.017 0.167
(3.445) (3.559) (0.447) (1.962) (0.317) (1.156)
Notes: The table shows the contemporaneous effect of the foreign (starred) variables on their domestic (bank
level) counterparts. These effects describe the co-movements among variables across the 30 banks examined in
this chapter. * denotes significance at the 10% level ** denotes significance at the 5% level and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Table D3: Average Pairwise Cross-section Correlations: Variables and Residuals
Nonperforming loans Return on Assets Loan to assets
Level 1st Diff. VECMX* Level 1st Diff. VECMX* Level 1st Diff. VECMX*
Bank2 0.6262 0.2070 -0.1004 0.0959 0.0186 -0.0729 -0.1016 0.0556 -0.0193
Bank3 0.6271 0.2351 0.0060 0.2925 0.1304 0.0406 0.0091 0.0766 0.0212
Bank4 0.4342 0.1928 0.0440 0.0732 0.0577 0.0441 0.0215 0.0371 0.0027
Bank5 0.5217 0.1688 -0.0095 0.1682 0.0747 0.0395 -0.1111 0.0020 -0.0022
Bank6 0.3987 0.1030 0.0168 0.2375 0.0791 0.0853 0.1501 0.0364 0.0081
Bank7 0.3773 0.1884 0.0002 -0.1873 0.0289 0.0464 0.1081 0.0570 0.0323
Bank11 0.5037 0.1884 0.0016 0.2276 0.1494 0.0856 0.0700 0.0739 0.0427
Bank13 0.5664 0.1025 -0.0342 -0.0141 0.0299 0.0357 -0.0651 0.0185 -0.0088
Bank15 0.4785 0.1337 0.0166 0.2232 0.1097 0.0107 0.1482 0.0561 0.0093
Bank16 0.3368 0.0868 0.0252 0.0549 0.0257 0.0190 0.1037 0.0438 0.0028
Bank17 0.6446 0.1225 0.0148 0.2945 0.0714 0.0194 -0.0548 -0.0026 -0.0001
Bank19 0.5610 0.0424 -0.0238 0.1025 0.0005 -0.0407 -0.0223 0.0398 0.0712
Bank21 0.5141 0.0823 0.0157 0.2706 0.1307 0.0593 0.1128 0.0582 -0.0107
Bank25 0.3743 0.1545 0.0340 0.1030 -0.0261 0.0192 -0.0348 0.0420 0.0236
Bank26 0.4633 0.0834 -0.0064 0.2031 0.1616 0.0304 -0.0413 0.0250 -0.0242
Bank29 0.5481 0.1825 0.0643 0.1728 0.0570 0.0608 0.1174 0.0688 0.0054
Bank30 0.2182 0.0819 0.0059 0.1416 0.0011 0.0393 0.0220 0.0622 0.0449
Bank33 0.4276 0.1331 0.0009 -0.0063 0.0175 0.0050 0.0274 0.0701 -0.0270
Bank36 0.5142 0.1014 0.0453 0.3146 0.0945 0.0274 0.0820 0.0196 0.0050
Bank38 0.5652 0.1466 0.0217 0.2428 0.1174 0.0488 0.0317 -0.0129 0.0215
Bank39 0.3760 0.1228 0.0336 0.3304 0.0833 0.0214 -0.0397 0.0128 0.0446
Bank42 0.5055 0.0941 0.0071 0.2909 0.0724 0.0047 -0.0368 0.0391 0.0208
Bank46 0.0977 0.0302 0.0153 0.1155 0.0339 0.0438 -0.0118 0.0048 0.0162
Bank51 0.4464 0.0343 -0.0315 0.2710 0.1142 0.0427 -0.0339 0.0441 0.0256
Bank53 0.4130 0.1784 -0.0153 0.1616 0.0626 0.0215 0.1733 0.0300 -0.0095
Bank54 0.3853 -0.0036 -0.0150 0.2367 0.0830 -0.0051 -0.0610 0.0770 0.0615
Bank56 0.2955 0.0510 0.0168 0.2447 0.0546 0.0178 0.1248 0.0396 0.0243
Bank58 0.3619 0.0223 -0.0087 0.1919 0.0114 0.0159 0.0717 -0.0031 0.0066
Bank59 0.5834 0.0209 0.0161 0.2528 -0.0494 -0.0422 0.1040 0.0915 0.0250
Bank61 0.4052 0.1383 -0.0178 -0.0678 0.0425 0.0783 0.1724 0.1068 0.0398
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